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Abstract: 
The unpredictability of returns counts as a stylized fact of financial markets. To reproduce this fact, modelers 
usually implement noise terms − a method with several downsides. Above all, systematic patterns are not 
eliminated but merely blurred. The present article introduces a model in which systematic patterns are removed 
endogenously. This is achieved in a reality-oriented way: Intelligent traders are able to identify patterns and 
exploit them. To identify and predict patterns, a very simple artificial neural network is used. As neural network 
mimic the cognitive processes of the human brain, this method might be regarded as a quite accurate way of how 
traders identify patterns and forecast prices in reality. The simulation experiments show that the artificial traders 
exploit patterns effectively and thereby remove them, which ultimately leads to the unpredictability of prices. 
Further results relate to the influence of pattern exploiters on market efficiency. 
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1. Problem Setting 
As one of their most essential statistical properties, price returns on financial markets are free 
from significant autocorrelations. Being a stronger proposition, advocates of market 
efficiency believe that financial markets are virtually unpredictable (see Fama 1965 in this 
context). Whereas the absence of autocorrelations (AA) is easy to show econometrically, the 
Absence of Systematic Patterns in price dynamics (ASP) is harder if not impossible to verify, 
as the number of potential patterns is infinite and patterns can be highly complex. Technical 
trading takes the existence of such patterns as its central credo, and empirical studies provide 
some evidence that some systematic patterns do exist, e.g. the so-called January Effect 
(Thaler 1987). Nevertheless, AA and ASP remain accurate outlines of market behavior.  
The general fulfillment of AA and ASP is a product of the profit-seeking behavior of traders. 
At the moment traders identify or believe that they have identified a systematic pattern in 
prices, they trade on it and thereby exploit it, which ultimately leads to the extinction of the 
particular pattern.1  
Financial market models (surveys by Hommes 2006 and LeBaron 2006) seek to imitate the 
statistical properties of real markets. AA and ASP, therefore, constitute important criteria to 
evaluate the accuracy of the behavior of these models. To test econometrically if prices evolve 
more or less unpredictably, modelers usually limit themselves to the replication of AA. AA is 
a necessary condition for ASP but not a sufficient one as systematic patterns might be too 
complex to be mirrored in significant autocorrelations. 
Table 1 provides an overview of selected financial market models with regard to the particular 
method used to reproduce AA. The table is based on the survey by Chen et al. (2009). The 
authors review 50 financial market models, classify them according to their origin and design, 
and report the particular stylized facts explained. The 27 models which, according to the 
authors, “explain” the absence of autocorrelations have been examined in more detail. 
-- Table 1 about here -- 
                                                 
1 We admit that this logic is idealized. Regularities could be extremely complex such that traders do not 
recognize them, or some traders do recognize them but their trading capital could be too low to exploit the 
pattern entirely (analogue to the well-known “limits of arbitrage” by Shleifer 1997). Further, the argument is not 
valid for mid-term or long-term patterns. For example, financial dynamics appear to oscillate in the long term 
due to business cycles (Greenwald and Stiglitz 1993).  
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The table illustrates that to reproduce AA, modelers commonly use stochastic model 
components, and this applies for every model design and origin.2 In some models (e.g. table 
entries 2, 4, 6 and 11), such noise terms are contained directly in the mechanism of price 
formation. Others chose more elegant, indirect solutions by implementing random terms into 
the behavior of agents (12, 21) or into the components agents react to, which can be news (10, 
13, 20), trading signals (18, 19, 22) or dividends (13, 26, 27). A popular argument to 
implement stochastic components refers to the behavior of so-called “noise traders” (1, 4, 6, 
25). According to Black (1986), noise traders “trade on noise as if it were information”. As 
the particular behavior of noise traders does not follow a uniform logic, it can be nicely 
approximated stochastically. 
The use of stochastic components is a viable and effective way to replicate AA. It is effective 
since by adding a sufficient amount of noise, the systematic behavioral patterns the 
deterministic model framework would generate can be blurred and prices evolve largely 
unpredictably. Nevertheless, the method is not free from considerable downsides. First, the 
amount of noise needed to eliminate detectable patterns can be very large, such that merely a 
small part of the movements of prices remains attributable to explicit model components. In 
general, the amount of noise needed declines with the structural complexity of the model as 
the interaction of deterministic mechanisms can lead to richer behavior. Greater model 
complexity, however, deteriorates the model’s tractability. Second, if random demand terms 
are chosen, a significant proportion of the total demand originates model-exogenously. It 
would be more desirable to model the sources of this demand explicitly, and thereby to 
improve the subjective completeness of the model. Third, the greater the share of total 
demand which arises randomly, the worse prices react to shifts of fundamentals. As a realistic 
behavior, we would expect that fundamental news is reflected more or less in changes of 
prices, at least when the news is considerable. Fourth, through stochastic components, 
systematic patterns are never removed in a strict sense but merely blurred. A mechanism 
causing the elimination of patterns endogenously is absent. Therefore, a genuine explanation 
for the absence of systematic patterns is not given.  
                                                 
2 Of course, the reproduction of AA is not the only purpose of using stochastic components. Producing volatility 
clustering or simply capturing effects which should not be modeled explicitly are examples for other functions. 
The modification of the grand-canonical minority game (e.g. Slanina et al. 1999) in table entry 17 constitutes an 
exception, as the authors attribute the AA-property to the fact that “speculators are exploring all available 
information”. Unfortunately this feature is not presented in detail. 
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The present article presents a model in which systematic patterns are removed endogenously, 
and without exogenous noise (apart from fundamental news) being added. The method is 
inspired by reality as it assumes traders are able to detect patterns in price dynamics and to 
exploit them. To detect and predict patterns, a linear regression model is used. The linear 
regression model can be interpreted as the simplest form of an Artificial Neuronal Network 
(ANN). ANNs mimic the information processing of the human brain technically and thus 
represent a relatively accurate way to model the perception of financial traders. As a second 
contribution, the simulations provide insights into the effect of pattern exploitation on market 
efficiency. It is shown that exploiters enforce the tendency of prices to reflect changes of 
value. On the other hand, the discrepancy between prices and value can rise. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Treating methodical issues, section 2 
illustrates theoretically how systematic patterns in prices can be removed endogenously. 
Section 3 deals with the application. At first, it introduces a simple model in which systematic 
patterns are recognized by traders and exploited. Then, the dynamic features of the model are 
illustrated while varying the impact of pattern exploiters. Section 4 summarizes the insights 
gained and highlights needs for future research.  
2. Method: Endogenous Eliminating of Systematic Patterns 
The endogenous elimination of systematic patterns embraces three components: (i) traders 
able to identify systematic patterns and to trade on them; (ii) a technique for the identification 
of these patterns; (iii) specific model features facilitating the effective implementation of (i) 
and (ii). In the following, the three components will be explained in the given order. 
2.1 The Basic Idea 
Consider an arbitrary asset market in which prices are formed in discrete steps of time. In 
such a framework, the price in time t, ௧ܲ, necessarily results from a set of information given at 
t. Let ߔ௧ denote this information set. Fundamental trading (Greenwald et al. 2001; Damodaran 
2002) rests on the belief that ߔ௧ includes fundamental information − the price of some asset is 
not completely independent from its fundamental value, ܨ௧. Consequently, fundamental 
traders seek to identify ܨ௧ and to exploit mispricing. In contrast, technical trading (Murphy 
1999; Pring 2002) assumes that ߔ௧ also includes past prices, ( ௧ܲିଵ, ௧ܲିଶ,…, ௧ܲି௡). If the price 
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in t is indeed influenced by the evolution of prices in the past, systematic patterns in prices 
exist. These basic insights can be formalized as follows. 
  ௧ܲ ൌ ݃௧ሾΦ୲ሿ,							Φ୲ ൌ ሾܨ௧, ௧ܲିଵ, ௧ܲିଶ, … , ௧ܲି௡ሿ, (1) 
where ݃௧ is a deterministic or stochastic function of arbitrary complexity describing the 
behavior of prices at time t. Note that (1) does not state that prices are necessarily influenced 
by their history nor by value (the respective coefficients in ݃௧ could equal zero) but merely 
that these are possible determinants for prices. 
Financial trading implies the formation of expectations about prices, where ܧ௧௜ሾ ௧ܲା୼ሿ should 
denote the price of time ݐ ൅ Δ (Δ ൐ 0) expected by trader or trader group i at ݐ. The 
expectation of a financial speculator is a central determinant for her3 demand of assets. Taking 
this into account, in many financial market models, the formulation of the net demand is 
based on the following principle:   
 ܦ௧௜ ൌ ߙ௜ ቀ൫ܧ௧௜ሾ ௧ܲାଵሿ|Φ୲୧൯ െ ௧ܲቁ, (2) 
with 
 ܧ௧௜ሾ ௧ܲାଵሿ|ߔ௧௜ ൌ ݄௧௜ሺߔ௧௜ሻ, (3) 
where ߙ௜ is a constant parameter, and ߔ௧௜ is a set of fundamental and/or technical information 
available in t and considered by i for the formation of expectations. The equation stipulates 
that traders buy (/sell) if the price they would pay (/receive) is below (/above) their 
expectation of the price in the next period, and their net demand rises with the difference 
between their expectation and the transaction price. ߙ௜ can be interpreted as i’s reaction 
intensity as it regulates the net demand for a given value of ൫ܧ௧௜ሾ ௧ܲାଵሿ െ ௧ܲ൯. ݄௧௜  is an arbitrary 
deterministic or stochastic expectation function. Popular examples are ݄௧ிሺ ௧ܲ, ܨ௧ሻ ≔ ௧ܲ ൅
ߜிሺܨ௧ െ ௧ܲሻ or ݄௧஼ሺ ௧ܲ, ௧ܲିଵሻ ≔ ௧ܲ ൅ ߜ஼ሺ ௧ܲ െ ௧ܲିଵሻ, with ߜி and ߜ஼ being positive 
parameters. ݄௧ி represents a stylized description of the philosophy of fundamentalists, who 
expect prices to return to value to some degree. ݄௧஼ expresses the trend extrapolation by 
technical traders.  
Deterministic features of the rules of trading, as the ones above, are the origin of systematic 
patterns in prices. For example, the behavior of technical traders with expectation function ݄௧஼	 
induces a piece of positive feedback into the dynamics of prices. However, any mechanism 
which would work against these patterns is absent in the above framework.  
                                                 
3 For the sake of inclusive language, the author will use the feminine pronouns to represent individual actions. 
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Before an endogenous mechanism to remove systematic patterns is developed, it is helpful to 
recall the mechanism of how patterns may be removed in real markets. This mechanism 
involves three necessary steps: 
I.  Pattern recognition: Traders recognize systematic pattern in price dynamics. 
II.  Pattern exploitation: Traders seek to take profits by trading on the patterns identified. 
III. Pattern reduction: The exploitation of a pattern reduces its appearance and ultimately 
removes it.  
A model in which all traders follow the rules ݄௧ி or ݄௧஼, or similar static rules, has problems 
fulfilling the very first necessary step (I): Traders do not recognize systematic patterns but 
stick to a constant trading behavior. The fulfillment of (I) requires that some traders seek to 
estimate the function ݃௧ሺߔ௧ሻ, which describes the actual behavior of prices. The index X 
should denote these “pattern exploiters”. Their expectation formation can be written as: 
  ܧ௧௑ሾ ௧ܲାଵሿ|Φ୲ଡ଼ ൌ ݃௧ାଵෟ௧௑ሺΦ୲ଡ଼	ሻ, (4) 
where ݃௧ାଵෟ௧௑stands for the estimation of ݃௧ାଵ (the function giving the price ௧ܲାଵ) by 
exploiters in t. A trader forming his expectation according to (4) and formulating his demand 
according to (1), buys (/sells) for each price ௧ܲ for which she predicts a rise (/fall) of prices 
from t to t+1. This behavior is perfectly profit-oriented as the price change from t to t+1 (i.e. 
the return ௧ܲାଵ െ ௧ܲ) determinates the immediate profit of the trader. The trading behavior 
specified by (1) and (2), hence, have satisfies step (II), as patterns are exploited.   
Whether the exploitation of the identified pattern reduces the pattern identified or not, such 
that step (III) is fulfilled, depends on the mechanism of price adaption. Financial market 
models often use a stylized market maker as proposed by Farmer and Joshi 2002. The marker 
maker acts as an intermediary between supply and demand which reacts to the amount of 
excess demand in the market through the  adjustments of prices. This behavior can be 
formalized as: ௧ܲାଵ ൌ ௧ܲ ൅ ߙெܦ௧, where ܦ௧ represents the excess demand in the market at 
time t and ߙெ is a positive reaction coefficient. If the marker maker approach is chosen, step 
(III) can be violated. The reason is that prices do not necessarily reflect the expectation of 
traders, but the market maker herself can create systematic patterns in prices. For example, if 
the value of ߙெ is too high, the market maker overacts, and prices tend to fluctuate around the 
equilibrium price. The problem is prevented if equilibrium prices are computed directly. The 
respective formalization is: 
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 ௧ܲ ൌ ௧ܲ|ሺܦ௧ሺ ௧ܲሻ ൌ 0ሻ.  (5) 
To prove that in the market described, regularities can be removed endogenously, we 
formulate the following proposition:  
 
Proposition 1: If the following conditions are fulfilled, prices will evolve completely 
unpredictably: (i) every trader behaves according to equation (2) and (4); (ii) traders are 
omniscient – they know the function ݃௧ and all relevant information contained in ߔ௧ in all t; 
(iii) prices result according to (5). 
 
Proof: Condition (ii) implies that ܧ௧௜ሾ ௧ܲାଵሿ ൌ ܧ௧௝ሾ ௧ܲାଵሿ ൌ ܧ௧ሾ ௧ܲାଵሿ	∀݅, ݆ (If traders are 
omniscient, they will arrive at the same price expectation, ܧ௧ሾ ௧ܲାଵሿ). Using this equality, the 
total demand in the market, ܦ௧, is given by a reformulation of eq. (2):  
 ܦ௧ ൌ ܰ ∗ αሺܧ௧ሾ ௧ܲାଵሿሺΦ୲ᇱሻ െ ௧ܲሻ, (6) 
where N is the number of traders. Inserting (6) into (5) yields for the equilibrium price 
௧ܲ ൌ ௧ܲ|N ∗ α൫ܧ௧ሾ ௧ܲାଵሿሺΦ୲୧ሻ െ ௧ܲ൯ ൌ 0. Since ܰ, α ൐ 0, the only solution of latter 
equivalence is the price for which ሺܧ௧ሾ ௧ܲାଵሿሺΦ୲୧ሻ െ ௧ܲሻ ൌ 0. Hence,  
 ௧ܲ ൌ ܧ௧ሾ ௧ܲାଵሿሺΦ୲୧ሻ	∀ݐ. (7) 
In other words, under conditions (i – iii), at each time t the price ௧ܲ will be such that traders 
neither expect a rise nor a fall of prices in the next period, as ௧ܲ already reflects all 
information that traders believe to be relevant. Therefore, any non-zero return ݎ௧ାଵ ൌ ௧ܲାଵ െ
௧ܲ can only be due to information which traders did not consider in t. From the perspective of 
traders, the returns ݎ௧ are thus unpredictable for all t. Note that (7) alone does not imply prices 
are free from any systematic patterns but only from those patterns which traders have 
recognized. The absence of any pattern is dependent on the omniscience of traders as 
proposed by condition (ii). Omniscient traders know ݃௧ and Φ୲ by definition. Hence, any 
divergence of ௧ܲ ൌ ܧ௧ሾ ௧ܲାଵሿሺΦ୲ሻ ൌ ݃௧ሺΦ୲ሻ from ௧ܲାଵ ൌ ݃௧ାଵሺΦ୲ାଵሻ can only be due to true 
news – exogenous events that could not be known nor be expected in t. It is easy to see that 
such news can either be equal in a change of ݃௧ or ߔ௧ from t to t+1. A change of ݃௧ can be 
due to an alteration of the market structure (e.g. a new mechanism of price setting) or traders’ 
behavior. A change of Φ୲, on the other hand, can only be caused by a shift of the fundamental 
value ܨ௧ from t to t+1, as all other information included in Φ୲ାଵ ൌ ሾܨ௧ାଵ, ௧ܲ, ௧ܲିଵ, … ௧ܲି௡ିଵሿ 
are already known to omniscient traders in t (including the price ௧ܲ, which, according to (1), is 
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equal to ݃௧ሺΦ୲ሻ). As true news, such as new fundamental information, is by definition 
unsystematic and unpredictable, every price change from t to t+1 will be unpredictable, too. 
Proposition 1 describes an extreme, theoretical scenario, and aims at demonstrating that under 
specific conditions, any systematic pattern will be eliminated. The scenario is extreme and 
theoretical as it assumes the absence of any information deficit and perfectly rational behavior 
for all traders.4 Of course, in reality – as well as in the agent-based model presented later – 
these conditions are not fulfilled, such that some systematic patterns might occur at least 
temporarily – think of a sequence of positive returns during a speculative rally, for example. 
However, the consideration above can be used to derive the determinants for the degree to 
which systematic patterns are actually removed. The first determinant is the relative trading 
power of pattern exploiters. Only if their trading power is sufficiently great will prices indeed 
fully reflect their expectation such that eq. (7) is fulfilled. A violation of this condition can be 
read analogously to the “limits of arbitrage” (Shleifer 1997); Exploiters identify regularities in 
the evolution of prices but cannot exploit them entirely because their investment capital is too 
small. The second determinant is the knowledge of these traders. In principle, any pattern 
which is not identified correctly will not be exploited and, thus, can persist, although 
exploiters’ trading power might be great. If traders miss existent patterns or misinterpret them, 
their trading activity moves prices towards some value ௧ܲ for which under c.p. assumptions 
௧ܲାଵ ് ௧ܲ. Hence, the following price change is not completely unforeseeable, although eq. 
(7) might be true. In the ideal case, exploiters have perfect knowledge about ݃௧ and Φ୲ at all t. 
In sum, the degree to which autocorrelations will be removed tends to be greater, the greater 
the trading power of pattern exploiters and the better their ability of pattern perception.  
2.2 Techniques for Pattern Recognition and Price Prediction. 
Eq. (1) has stated that the price in t is determined by ௧ܲ ൌ ݃௧ሾΦ୲ሿ. The identification of 
patterns implies forming an estimation about ݃௧, denoted ݃௧ෞ. This estimation is then 
fundamental for price prediction. In this section, we briefly discuss three modeling 
                                                 
4 Still, the assumptions made are not unusual in economic theory, particularly in studies dealing with market 
efficiency. Fama (1965), for example, writes: An "efficient" market is defined as a market where there are large 
numbers of rational, profit-maximizers actively competing, with each trying to predict future market values of 
individual securities, and where important current information is almost freely available to all participants.” 
Having made this definition, Fama argues that under similar assumption, the activity of “intelligent” traders 
cause prices to follow a random walk, which is free from any systematic patterns. Unfortunately, Fama does not 
derive this point from a formal proof but from a verbal argument.   
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alternatives to obtain ݃௧ෞ, including their pros and cons. Beside a) perfect knowledge, these 
alternatives are b) regression and c) artificial neuronal networks, where the latter two 
approximate ݃௧ through price history.  
a) Perfect knowledge  
Perfect knowledge of traders was occasionally assumed in section 2.1. It implies that   ݃௧ෞ ൌ
݃௧, ∀ݐ. As its greatest advantage, the method is the most effective one for the endogenous 
removal of systematic patterns, as any existent pattern will be exploited. Further, model 
complexity increases little, as no mechanism of pattern detection has to be implemented. On 
the other hand, perfect knowledge is not a realistic assumption for financial traders. 
Moreover, ݃௧ can be very complex, because the behavior of pattern exploiters re-affects the 
law of motion, which in turn  affects the behavior of exploiters. Solving such recursive 
problems can be intricate and identifying the true function ݃௧ may be hardly possible.  
b) Regression 
If perfect knowledge is not given, traders have to identify regularities in prices from price 
history. The simplest method to do this is regression. As the first step, regression implies 
devising a reasonable regression model, which is a hypothetical relationship between the price 
௧ܲ, representing the dependent variable, and the independent variables potentially determining 
௧ܲ. For instance, agents could believe that prices ௧ܲ are possibly influenced by the present 
fundamental value ܨ௧ as well as by the prices in the two periods preceding, ௧ܲିଵ and ௧ܲିଶ, and 
that the relationship is linear. A corresponding generic form of ݃௧ෞ is:  
 ݃௧ෞሺܨ௧, ௧ܲିଵ, ௧ܲିଶሻ ∶ൌ ௧ܲ ൌ ߚଵܨ௧ ൅ ߚଶ ௧ܲିଵ ൅ ߚଷ ௧ܲିଶ (8) 
(In the model introduced in section 3, pattern exploiters will be realized by the very model 
above.) The second step consists of the estimation of the regression coefficients ߚଵ to ߚ௡. To 
this purpose, agents use a defined frame of historical data, e.g. the last N periods, and set the 
regression coefficients such that a certain error criterion, e.g. the mean square error (here: 
∑ ሺܧ௞ሾ ௞ܲሿ െ ௞ܲሻଶିଵ௞ୀ௧ିே /ܰ), is minimized for the time frame considered. For an advanced 
regression approach for stock market prediction, see Yang et al. (2002). 
Choosing regression techniques for pattern detection is attractive as the method is relatively 
simple to implement and easy to understand. Nevertheless, by linear regression, 
autocorrelations in returns can be identified exhaustively. Hence, the method effectively 
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contributes to the fulfillment of the stylized fact of no correlations in raw returns. However, 
the complexity of the regularities learnable is limited by the regression model. For instance, if 
the regression model is linear, traders cannot identify non-linear regularities and so their 
predictions will imply considerable systematic errors. Thus, not all complex patterns will be 
exploited and removed. If pattern complexity is greater, a regression model of at least equal 
complexity is required. The design of such models implies many degrees of freedom. Simply 
choosing the correct model (if ascertainable) implies that traders have profound previous 
knowledge, which might be an unrealistic assumption.  
c) Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs). 
ANNs (see Basheer and Hajmeer 2000 for an introduction) may be regarded as the most 
sophisticated method of establishing ݃௧ෞ. ANNs are inspired by the human brain, which 
consists of complex webs of densely interconnected neurons. When the aggregate input of a 
neuron exceeds a certain threshold, the cell “fires” and activates other linked neurons if their 
stimulation is sufficient. Invented by psychologist Frank Rosenblatt in 1958, ANNs replicate 
the biological process numerically. Here, neurons are represented by artificial units organized 
in layers. The first layer is the input layer whose units each represent a sensor for the value of 
one independent variable (here: Φ୲ ൌ ሾܨ௧, ௧ܲିଵ, ௧ܲିଶ, … ௧ܲି௡ሿ). The last layer is the output 
layer. The output unit yields the result, that is, the value of the dependent variable (here: ௧ܲ, 
respectively ܧ௧ሾ ௧ܲାଵሿ). Between input and output layer, several hidden layers can be 
implemented. Units in the hidden and output layers each represent functions. (Often sigmoid 
functions are used.) The input of each of these functions is the sum of the outputs of the units 
in the upstream layer with each output multiplied by a weight factor. Through the respective 
setting of these weight factors, the ANN can represent a variety of relationships between 
dependent and independent variables. The step of training aims at “teaching” the ANN the 
relationships existent in the particular case of application. The so-called Backpropagation 
algorithm is common for this purpose. The algorithm takes the network output and compares 
it to the target value of a set of training examples. The discrepancy is used as an indicator for 
how to adapt the weights within the network. Backpropagation denotes the successive 
retracing of the estimation error from the output unit to earlier units to correct their weight 
factors.  
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In general, the complexity of the function learnable by the ANN rises with the number of 
hidden layers and the number of units in these layers. An ANN which does not contain any 
hidden layers is equivalent to a linear regression model as it can only represent linear 
functions. The weights of such an ANN correspond to the regression coefficients ß and 
training the ANN will lead to the solution that minimizes a defined error criterion. The 
regression model specified by eq. (8) can thus be realized by an ANN. Interpreted that way, 
(8) can be regarded as quite an accurate reproduction of the cognition of relatively simple-
minded but still intelligent traders.  
To sum up, ANNs provide two considerable advantages: First, ANNs are capable of learning 
regularities of arbitrary complexity, provided that the number of hidden layers and units is 
great enough. Hence, by using ANNs, virtually any pattern can be eliminated, theoretically. 
The elimination of complex patterns is even possible by an ANN with a tractable structure. 
Cybenko (1988), for example, proves that any continuous and multivariate function can be 
approximated with an error approaching zero by a feed-forward network with only one hidden 
layer. Due to their ability to detect complex patterns, ANNs are a popular tool for financial 
forecasting (books on this topic were authored by Azoff 1994 and Gately 1996. For recent 
research see Majhi et al. 2009 or Nair et al. 2011). Second, ANNs are a very accurate way of 
modeling the perception of financial traders, because the principle derives from the workings 
of the human brain. Regarding this, financial market models using ANN-traders are still 
relatively scarce (examples include Beltratti and Margarita 1992, Belratti et al. 1996, and 
Hommes 2001).  
The scarcity of financial market models based on ANNs may be due to three reasons. First, 
although the ANN per se can be created quickly, using it in a reasonable way is an intricate 
endeavor. In particular, the configuration of the ANN involves many degrees of freedom and 
identifying an appropriate design requires much trial and error. (We do not want to discuss the 
design choices in detail here, as this is its own topic, but point to the respective works dealing 
with such problems, e.g. Haykin 2009). Second, training ANNs can require considerable 
computational power. The computational demand rises more than proportionally with the 
number of units in network, because every new unit implies another weight factor to be 
learned for every link-neighbor. In the case of financial markets and the respective models, 
the problem becomes even worse because the network must be retrained often as the behavior 
of prices is not necessarily constant but new systematic patterns may emerge. To guarantee 
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that traders can identify some pattern at the moment it becomes established, retraining must 
even be done periodically. Third, the ANN(s) usually appears as a “black box” to the 
observer. The transparency of the model and its dynamics is reduced. 
2.3 Necessary and Convenient Model Features 
The techniques and building blocks presented up to now can be the cornerstones of a model in 
which systematic patterns are removed endogenously. Yet, in the model presented in the 
following, their implementation brings about the need for other specific model features. In the 
following, we provide an overview of the necessary and convenient features of that model for 
the endogenous removal of systematic patterns. The necessary features have already been 
explained: 
(1) Pattern exploiters 
At least some traders must be able to identify the patterns to be removed and trade on them.  
(2) Appropriate price setting mechanism 
Price setting can be modeled in different ways, but some of them, e.g. a stylized market 
maker, do not necessarily lead to the reduction of the patterns exploiters are trading on. 
Computing equilibrium prices has been shown to be an appropriate approach to this end.5  
 
The two conditions described are necessary for the endogenous removal of regularities. 
However, their fulfillment may still lead to problems concerning the implementation of 
pattern exploiters and the resulting model dynamics. To prevent these problems, two model 
features turn out to be convenient.  
(3) Fundamental News 
In the proof of proposition 1 it has been shown that, if systematic patterns in prices are 
removed, changes of prices can only be due to true news. This implies that if no news occurs, 
௧ܲାଵ ൌ ௧ܲ, ∀ݐ. Put differently, pattern exploiters tend to drive the market towards its steady 
                                                 
5 Of course, this is still a simplification of price formation in real markets. For example, in stock markets prices 
are usually formed by the matching of sell or buy requests listed in an order book. Evidently, this mechanism is 
also appropriate for the removal of patterns although the market is not necessarily in equilibrium for the last 
trading price. 
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state, countering endogenous market dynamics. To preserve dynamic complexity, true news is 
required. The implementation of a news arrival process can be achieved by a reality-oriented 
reproduction of the evolution of the fundamental value. The fundamental value of an asset is 
usually regarded to follow a random walk (Fama 1965 and followers). Adopting the random 
walk approach for the fundamental value ܨ௧ prevents the model from converging on its steady 
state. In contrast, setting ܨ௧ constant, as practiced by many modelers, is an unfavorable 
simplification in the context of pattern exploitation. 
(4) Discrete Time 
Formulating the model in discrete time solves a purely technical difficulty. Perfect removal of 
regularities requires their identification at the moment they are established. In a continuous-
time model this would create immense computation costs, in particular if using ANNs. The 
discrete time approach reduces the computation time and thus enhances the tractability of the 
model.  
3 Application 
This section introduces a simple financial market model in which systematic patterns tend to 
arise mainly through the activity of trend followers. The simulations demonstrate that pattern 
exploiters effectively identify and trade on these patterns, leading to a model dynamics which 
again evolves unpredictably. Further results concern the effect of pattern exploiters on market 
efficiency. 
3.1 The Model  
The model introduced next can be interpreted as an adaption of the deterministic framework 
of the model presented in Dieci and Westerhoff (2006), which is based on the fundamentalist-
chartist approach. The framework mentioned is an appropriate basis to illustrate the effect of 
pattern exploiters for four reasons: (i) it is relatively simple, (ii) it is formulated in discrete 
time, (iii) it produces systematic patterns in prices, (iv) it includes a profit-based switching 
mechanism between strategies by which some interesting emergent phenomena can be 
uncovered. Major differences of the model introduced here compared to Dieci and Westerhoff 
(2006) concern the following aspect. 
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 Pattern exploiters. Pattern exploiters who behave in the way described in section 2.1 
are introduced as an additional third trader group.   
 2-day moving average prediction of chartists. Compared to the simple extrapolation 
of the most recent trend, the 2-day moving average prediction adds an additional 
variable ( ௧ܲିଶሻ, causing a more complex systematic pattern.  
The other differences are due to the realization of the requirements identified in section 2.3: 
 Random walk of the fundamental value, instead of constant value. 
 Equilibrium pricing, instead of market maker approach. 
 
The resulting model consists of four major components: the expectation formation, the 
demand formulation, the switching mechanism, and the mechanism of price and value 
formation. The components interrelate according to the following logic: In each period, 
traders formulate their demand relative to their expectation about the price in the next period. 
Price expectations are formed according to different trading strategies: a fundamental rule, 
technical trend extrapolation, and sophisticated pattern exploitation. Furthermore, traders 
switch between these strategies. A strategy is the more popular, the more profits it has 
generated in the past. Finally, prices are formed such that demand and supply are equal. In a 
formal fashion, the model can be described as follows: 
3.1.1 Expectation Formation 
At each time t, traders form an expectation about the price of the asset in the next period. For 
fundamentalists this expectation is 
 ܧ௧୊ሾ ௧ܲାଵሿ| ௧ܲ ൌ ௧ܲ ൅ ߢሺܨ௧ െ ௧ܲሻ (9) 
which stipulates that fundamentalists expect prices to adapt to the fundamental value to some 
degree specified by the parameter ߢ (ߢ ∈ ሿ0; 1ሿ).  
Chartists believe trends will continue. To identify trends, moving averages are computed 
(Brock and Hommes 1998). In our model, chartists rely on the 2-day weighted moving 
average. Their expectation then results from the extrapolation of this trend, formally: 
 ܧ௧େሾ ௧ܲାଵሿሺ ௧ܲሻ ൌ ௧ܲ ൅ ሺ2ݎ௧ ൅ ݎ௧ିଵሻ/3, (10) 
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where ݎ௧ represents the most recent return in t: ݎ௧ ൌ ௧ܲ െ ௧ܲିଵ. Due to their extrapolative 
expectation and the resulting demand, chartists induce positive feedback into the dynamics of 
prices, and thus create a source of systematic patterns of prices.  
Pattern exploiters compute their expectation analogue to eq. (4) in section 2.1. For simplicity, 
we assume that exploiters do not expect the law of motion ݃௧ to change from t to t+1. Hence, 
instead of ݃௧ାଵෟ௧௑, we can write ݃௧ෞ௧௑, or in short, ො݃௧௑. This leads to: 
 ܧ௧ଡ଼ሾ ௧ܲାଵሿ| ௧ܲ ൌ ො݃௧௑	ሾΦ୲ଡ଼ሿሺP୲ሻ (11) 
The information set Φ୲ଡ଼ will be specified in section 3.2. Note that the expectation about ௧ܲାଵ 
is a function of the price ௧ܲ. 
3.1.2 Demand Formulation 
Each trader group derives their demand from the expected return ܧ௧୧ሾݎ௧ାଵሿ| ௧ܲ ൌ ܧ௧୧ሾ ௧ܲାଵሿ| ௧ܲ െ
௧ܲ. For any transaction price ௧ܲ they buy, if for ௧ܲ they expect a following price rise 
(ܧ௧୧ሾݎ௧ାଵሿ| ௧ܲ positive) and sell if they expect a price fall (ܧ௧୧ሾݎ௧ାଵሿ| ௧ܲ negative). Assuming a 
linear function, this logic can be expressed as 
 ܦ௧୧ሺ ௧ܲሻ ൌ α୧൫ܧ௧୧ሾݎ௧ାଵሿ| ௧ܲ	൯,						݅ ∈ ሼܨ, ܥ, ܺሽ, (12) 
where ܦ௧୧ሺ ௧ܲሻ is the net demand of trader group i at price ௧ܲ, and α୧ represents a positive 
reaction parameter, as explained in section 2.1.  
3.1.3 Switching Mechanism 
The switching mechanism relates to the switching of traders between strategies. A popular 
assumption is that a strategy tends to gain (/lose) followers if it produces more (/less) profits 
than alternatives (Brock and Hommes 1997, 1998; Hommes 2001). In Dieci and Westerhoff 
(2006), the weight of some trader group, respectively strategy i and time t, denoted ݓ௧௜, is 
determined by i’s attractiveness in t, denoted ܣ௧௜ , in the following fashion: 
  ݓ௧௜ ൌ ா௫௣ሾఊ஺೟
೔ ሿ
∑ ா௫௣ሾఊ஺೟೔ ሿ೔ , (13) 
where γ is a constant rationality parameter that regulates the sensitivity of traders’ reaction to 
a shift of the level of the attractiveness of a particular strategy. The attractiveness ܣ௧௜  
represents a stylized moving average over past profits:  
 ܣ௧௜ ൌ ηܣ௧ିଵ௜ ൅ ݎ௧ିଵܦ௧ିଶ௜ . (14) 
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ݎ௧ିଵܦ௧ିଶ௜  represents the value change of the long/short position built up, based on strategy i at 
price ௧ܲିଶ due to the price change from t-2 to t-1. The influence of this most recent profit for 
ܣ௧௜  relative to preceding profits stored in ܣ௧ିଵ௜  is greater, the lower the positive parameter ߟ. In 
this sense, ߟ reflects agents’ memory.  
Technically, the switching mechanism defined above produces alterations in the model 
structure, because it implies changes of the state variables ܣ௧௜ . As in reality, these structural 
changes can lead to the emergence of new systematic patterns while others disappear. To 
discover new patterns, traders have to remain in a permanent state of alertness and learn 
continuously. Vice versa, simply relying on old patterns to persist is not optimal to maximize 
profits. 
3.1.4 Price and Value Formation 
The mechanism of price adaption is equal to the equilibrium pricing principle, specified by 
equation 5. The total demand, denoted ܦ௧ሺ ௧ܲሻ, results from the weighted sum of the net 
demand of all trader groups i: 
 ܦ௧ሺ ௧ܲሻ ൌ ∑ ݓ௧௜୧ ܦ௧௜ሺ ௧ܲሻ,					݅ ∈ ሼܨ, ܥ, ܺሽ (15) 
For the fundamental value, we adopt the random walk assumption: 
 ܨ௧ ൌ ܨ௧ିଵ ൅ ߓ௧,					ߓ௧ ∈ ܰሺߤ௜, ߪ௜ଶሻ (16) 
ߓ௧ stands for changes of value caused by fundamental news emerging after t-1 and not later 
than t. These value changes are IID normally distributed with mean ߤ and variance ߪଶ. 
3.1.5 Law of motion 
Note that the model market specified above complies with the requirements identified in 
section 2.3. Hence, the necessary and convenient model features for the endogenous removal 
of systematic patterns are given. 
If we abstract from pattern exploiters, the law of motion of prices results from a combination 
of eqs. (5), (8), (9), (10), (11), and (14):  
 ௧ܲ ൌ ݃௧ሺΦ୲ሻ ൌ ଷ௪೟
ಷ఑஑ూ
୞ ܨ௧ െ
௪೟಴஑ి
୞ ௧ܲିଵ െ
௪೟಴஑ి
୞ ௧ܲିଶ (17) 
with Ζ ൌ 3ݓ௧ிߢα୊ ൅ ݓ௧஼αେ. The law of motion is equivalent to the function ݃௧ሺΦ୲ሻ. The input 
for this function is given by the information set ߔ௧, which is here ߔ௧ ൌ ሾF୲, P୲ିଵ, P୲ିଶሿ. Hence, 
any pattern exploiter could exploit the deterministic features perfectly if she knew ݃௧ and ߔ௧. 
 17 
 
Still, the active intervention of pattern exploiters will influence the function ݃௧, and possibly 
extend ߔ௧ by other fundamental or technical information. For the latter to occur, it is 
sufficient that pattern exploiters believe this information to be relevant and react to it. The 
identification and exploitation of patterns is thus a recursive process, in which the actual law 
of motion of prices changes.  
3.2 Model Calibration 
The calibration of the model refers to two aspects: the setting of the parameters included in 
the model equations and the specification of pattern exploiters. 
3.2.1 Parameter setting 
Table 1 gives an overview of the model parameters and their settings. The parameter setting 
of the switching mechanism, γ and η, was adopted identically from Dieci and Westerhoff 
(2006). σ is set to 1%, which should be a reasonable assumption for the volatility of the 
fundamental value. The reaction coefficients of trader groups could be set rather freely as 
there is no empirical data for these values. Setting ߢ	ߙி ൌ ߙ஼ ൌ 1 might be the most salient 
assumption, which further generates a stable model dynamics. ߙி can be regarded as the 
independent variable which regulates the influence of pattern exploiters and, hence, the 
degree to which pattern will be removed.  
-- Table 2 about here -- 
3.2.2 Pattern Exploiters 
Pattern exploiters should be configured such that they are able to identify the true behavior of 
the deterministic model as specified by the law of motion ݃௧ሺߔ௧ሻ (eq. 17). As ݃௧ሺߔ௧ሻ is linear 
here, it can be represented perfectly by a linear prediction model. According to the 
independent variables of ݃௧ሺߔ௧ሻ, ߔ௧௑ is set to ߔ௧௑ ൌ ߔ௧ ൌ ሾܨ௧, ௧ܲିଵ, ௧ܲିଶሿ. This yields the 
prediction model specified by eq. (8). The model is realized technically by an ANN with no 
hidden layer. In each period t, the regression coefficients, respectively weight factors ߚଵ to ߚଷ, 
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are learned using the last 50 pairs of independent and dependent variables. The root mean 
squares are computed as the error criterion. 6 
3.3 Measures of predictability 
In general, a process complying with ASP (Absence of Systematic Patterns) is called a 
martingale. In discrete time, a martingale can be defined as a stochastic process with 
observations ଵܺ, ܺଶ, … for which ܧሾܺ௧ሿ ൏ ∞ and ܧሾܺ௧ାଵ|ܺ1,ܺ2,… , ܺݐሿ ൌ ܺݐ, that is, all 
preceding observations do not contain any evidence to believe that the next observation will 
be greater or smaller than the last one. In this sense, the process is unpredictable. The ASP 
property includes the AA property (Absence of significant Autocorrelations), meaning that 
autocorrelations between changes ܺ௧ െ ܺ௧ିଵ tend towards zero for all lags ߬ as the number of 
observations rises. The autocorrelation ܴሺ߬ሻ between the return in t and the return in ݐ െ ߬ is 
computed as:  
  ܴሺ߬ሻ ൌ ாሾሺ௥೟ିఓሻሺ௥೟షഓିఓሻሻሿఙమ , (18) 
where ߪଶ is the variance of returns observed. The existence of significant autocorrelations 
indicates the existence of systematic patterns in price dynamics. The reverse conclusion, 
however, does not necessarily hold. Though AA might be fulfilled, complex patterns in prices 
may still be present, such that ASP is violated. Ignoring this aspect, financial market models 
usually limited themselves to the ܴሺ߬ሻ indicator. For the goal of the present study, however, 
advanced indicators able to identify more complex patterns are needed. These indicators are 
provided by Challet (2005), who introduces two conditional measures of predictability.  
The first one, H, applies the mean return conditional to different patterns in prices. With S 
being the number of relevant patterns ߠ	ሺߠ ൌ 1,… , ܵ), H can be formulated as 
 ܪ ൌ ଵௌ ∑ 〈ݎ|ߠ〉ଶௌఏୀଵ  (19) 
The intuition of H is that in a market which is completely unpredictable, a certain pattern in 
prices, e.g. a price rise, should not give any information about the return in the next period, 
i.e. the mean return following this pattern tends to zero. H averages these mean returns over a 
set of patterns which are believed to be relevant. A higher H points to a greater predictability 
of price dynamics.  
                                                 
6 Choosing the right learning horizon implies dissolving a trade-off. Increasing the learning horizon provides 
more information to exploiters but enhances the probability that a law of motion is learned which is no longer 
valid. 
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Still, the indicator H does not capture all aspects of predictability as it misses predictability 
associated with oscillatory behavior. The latter can be identified by the third indicator, the 
conditional price return auto-correlation function ܭሺ߬ሻ. It can be written as: 
 ܭሺ߬ሻ ൌ ቀଵௌ ∑ ሺܴሺ߬ሻ|ߠሻௌఏୀଵ ߪଶ െ ܪቁ /ߪଶ, (20) 
where ܴሺ߬ሻ|ߠ is the correlation of price returns subsequent to occurrences of pattern ߠ.  
As traders do not include more than the last two prices into their trading calculus, any 
predictability of ௧ܲ can be derived from ሾܨ௧, ௧ܲିଵ, ௧ܲିଶ, ሿ. Therefore, ߬ ∈ ሾ1, 2ሿ will be 
investigated. (Challet 2005 limits himself to ߬ ൌ 1). To compute ܪ and ܭሺ߬ሻ, four patterns 
ߠ௞, are considered as relevant: ߠଵ: ݎ௧ ൐ 0, ߠଶ: ݎ௧ ൏ 0, ߠଷ:	ሺ2ݎ௧ ൅ ݎ௧ିଵሻ/3 ൐ 0, ߠସ:	ሺ2ݎ௧ ൅
ݎ௧ିଵሻ/3 ൏ 0. By representing a price rise and a price fall, respectively, ߠଵ and ߠଶ might be 
regarded as the simplest patterns possible. ߠଷ and ߠସ are derived from the trading philosophy 
of chartists, as they stand for a positive and negative two-day moving average, respectively. 
Hence, if the trading behavior of chartists penetrates the dynamics of prices such that 
predictability is caused, this predictability should be reliably captured by ܪ and ܭሺ߬ሻ.  
3.4 Simulation Results 
To understand the influence of pattern exploiters, it is fundamental to understand the model 
when these traders are absent. Therefore, we begin by simulating a basic framework in which 
only fundamentalist and chartists are active.  
3.4.1 The model without pattern exploiters 
Figure 1 shows the dynamics of model. The upper panel illustrates the price ௧ܲ (black) and the 
fundamental value ܨ௧ (gray). In principal, we observe excess volatility − prices evolve in a 
more volatile manner than value. More specifically, prices appear to be driven by certain 
momentum leading to fluctuations around value. The reason for this behavior is the interplay 
of trading strategies: Reacting to fundamental news, fundamentalist cause a movement of 
prices towards value. Technical traders interpret this movement as the beginning of a trend, 
and trade on it, thereby inducing momentum into the dynamics of prices by which prices 
overshoot value. The trend reverts once the mispricing is sufficiently great such that 
fundamental orders outweigh chartists, upon which the loop repeats.  
-- Fig. 1 about here -- 
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The fluctuation of prices around value is a simple example of a systematic pattern in the 
dynamics of prices. It is simple, as it is captured well by the autocorrelation of returns. The 
autocorrelations ܴሺ߬ሻ for different lags ߬ are indicated by the bottom panel, with the gray 
horizontal lines indicating the 1% level of significance. The panel shows that the basic 
framework produces great autocorrelations on the first two lags. The reason is that in eq. (9), 
chartists extrapolate the trends of the last two periods. For the third and fourth lag, the 
autocorrelations turn positive, which reflects the trend reversal due to fundamental trading. 
For the other lags, the scheme repeats. Formally, this pattern has been described by eq. 18. 
Note that in a market with fundamentalists only, ௧ܲ ൌ ܨ௧, ∀ݐ. This can be verified by simply 
combining eq. 5, 8, 11, and 14, meaning that systematic patterns in prices would be absent. 
From this perspective, the existence of the patterns can be attributed to the activity of 
chartists.  
3.4.2 The model with pattern exploiters 
Next, pattern exploiters enter the market. To begin with, we conduct a series of runs in which 
patterns exploiters merely observe the dynamics of the deterministic model before and merely 
form predictions about prices – exploiters do not influence the dynamics themselves. Then, 
we measure the average prediction error of trader groups i, defined as ߝ௜ ൌ ଵ் ∑ หܧ௧୧ሾ ௧ܲାଵሿ െ௧்ୀଵ
௧ܲାଵห. We find that, due to their artificial intelligence, exploiters are able to predict prices 
most accurately. (For the exemplar run, we get ߝ௑ ൌ 11.67 ∗ 10ିଷ)7. Fundamentalists, who 
believe prices to follow value, perform second best (ߝி ൌ 11.75 ∗ 10ିଷ), because the 
fundamental value is indeed the main anchor for the evolution of prices. However, 
fundamentalists ignore the predictive power of past returns and, thus, miss part of the 
information determining the evolution of prices. Chartists, who believe in the persistence of 
trends, commit the greatest prediction errors (ߝி ൌ 16.67 ∗ 10ିଷ), as with the fundamental 
                                                 
7  Note that a predictor who knows ݃௧ and Φ୲ would still commit prediction errors because ௧ܲାଵ is determined by ݃௧ାଵ and Φ୲ାଵ ൌ ሾܨ௧ାଵ, ௧ܲ, ௧ܲିଵሿ which are still unknown in t. Example: Under the assumption that market 
efficiency is perfect such that ௧ܲ ൌ ܨ௧, the best prediction for ௧ܲାଵ would be ௧ܲ. The resulting prediction error ߝ݅ 
would then correspond to average absolute change of value ሺ1/ܶሻ∑ |ߓ௧|௧்ୀଵ . The latter can be computed as 
ቀଵ்ቁ∑ |ߓ௧|௧்ୀଵ ൌ ඥ2 ߨ⁄ ∗ ߪ ൎ ሺwith	ߪ ൌ 0.01ሻ	7.98 ∗ 10ିଷ (Goldstein and Taleb 2007). 7.98 ∗ 10ିଷ can thus be 
interpreted as the minimum achievable for ߝ௜ as the number of observation tends towards infinity. Nevertheless, 
in the present model this value can hardly be reached. The reasons is changes of the state variables ܣ௧௜ , i.e. 
changes of the model structure, continuously alter the law of motion via the weights ݓ௧௜. Exploiters estimate the 
law of motion from historical data. Changes of the law in the meantime will thus lead to systematical errors. 
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value they ignore the most important determinant of prices. These results confirm that the 
prediction models of exploiters actually work. Furthermore, their superior prediction power 
potentially enables exploiters to achieve superior profits which potentially lead to a greater 
weight ݓ௧௑.  
Figure 2 depicts an exemplary simulation run in which exploiters actively participate in the 
market and their reaction intensity ߙ௑ is set to 10. The upper panel shows that prices have 
stopped fluctuating around value; at first glance, the systematic pattern in price seems to have 
disappeared. The third panel, which shows the autocorrelations of returns, confirms that the 
predictability of prices has dropped. Autocorrelations between returns are considerably lower 
compared to the run without exploiters. Nevertheless, significant autocorrelations are still 
present. These observations indicate that exploiters successfully exploit systematic patterns. 
However, their trading volume is still too low to remove patterns entirely.  
-- Fig. 2 about here -- 
The fourth panel depicts the weights of trader groups i. Two important insights are conveyed. 
First, the weight of exploiters (dark gray) on average exceeds the weight of fundamentalists 
(black) and chartists (light gray). Further, the weight of fundamentalists and the weight of 
chartists move in opposite directions to each other. The reason is that the beliefs of exploiters 
and chartist diverge greatly: chartists believe that trends will continue, whereas exploiters 
know that such patterns are almost always absent. Therefore, exploiters and chartists trade 
with each other, and, due to the great trading power of exploiters ߙ௑ ൌ 10, with great 
volume. However, as the prediction accuracy of exploiters (ߝ௑ ൌ 8.77 ∗ 10ିଷ) is significantly 
higher than the one of chartists (ߝ஼ ൌ 11.17 ∗ 10ିଷ), exploiters gain money from these 
transactions whereas chartists lose. As for every buy, there is one sale (eq. 14), the gains of 
exploiters mirror the losses of chartists. Because the weights of groups are dependent on 
profits, this leads to the mirror-inverted dynamics of both weights. In sum, pattern exploiters 
exploit those traders who are responsible for the emergence of systematic patterns.  
The second insight is that the weight of exploiters does not remain on a certain level but goes 
up and down. To understand the cause, assume that a systematic pattern is present which is 
identified by exploiters. Then, exploiters will start to trade on the pattern, and thereby achieve 
superior profits compared to other traders. Due to the superior profits, the weight of exploiters 
tends to rise. However, the more exploiters are in the market exploiting the particular pattern, 
the more the pattern is reduced. Thereby, the opportunity for exploiters to achieve superior 
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profits diminishes and their weight tends to fall again. (In an extreme case, the dynamics of 
prices is completely unpredictable. Hence, profit opportunities are equal no matter if a trader 
buys or sells). The withdrawal of exploiters makes it possible that systematic patterns 
reappear, and the loop repeats itself. In conclusion, the activity of exploiters undermines their 
own superiority, and thereby opens the door for the survival of other, less informed and/or 
less intelligent traders. (Another reason for the variations in weights is that in some periods, 
prices indeed follow trends, simply due to a random trend of the fundamental value. Hence, 
the predictions of chartists are sometimes relatively good). 
 
The exemplary run described above has confirmed the potential of our approach; systematic 
patterns are reduced successfully by the activity of intelligent traders. As a second step, we 
conduct a systematic analysis of the influence of these traders on market predictability. The 
results are displayed in figure 3. The setup of the large data experiment is as follows: We 
simulate the model with fundamentalists, chartists, and exploiters. The reaction parameter of 
exploiters ߙ௑ represents the independent variable which is either set to 0, 1, 5, or 10. For each 
value of ߙ௑, 100 runs with 5,000 periods each have been simulated, including an initial  
transition period of 1,000 periods which has been rejected. The dependent variables are given 
by the indicators of predictability introduced in section 3.3. The results are summarized by 
Box-Whisker-Plots. The bottom (top) of the box represents the 25th (75th) percentile. The mid 
vertical line represents the median and the black dot the mean. The upper (lower) end of the 
whisker indicates the minimum (maximum) observation.  
-- Fig. 3 about here -- 
The experiments show that all measures of predictability, including the measures of 
conditional predictability, ܪ and ܭሺ߬ሻ, are continuously decreasing due to a greater influence 
of exploiters as specified by ߙ௑. For greater settings of ߙ௑, there are several runs in which 
predictability measures are not significant anymore. In conclusion, the predictability of prices 
can be reduced effectively, up to their disappearance, by traders who recognize the behavior 
of prices and trade on the patterns found. 
 
Let us conclude by examining some remarkable incidental results on the influence of pattern 
exploiters on market efficiency. Figure 4 depicts three indicators of efficiency:  
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Market distortion, D:  
 ܦ ൌ ଵ் ∑ ܦ௧௧்ୀଵ ,					with	ܦ௧ ൌ | ௧ܲ െ ܨ௧|,  (21) 
where T stands for the number of observations. D captures the tendency of price to reflect 
value in terms of the absolute average mispricing.  
Excess volatility, ܸ௘௫:  
 ܸ௘௫ ൌ ଵ் ∑ ݎ௧௘௫௧்ୀଵ ,					with	ݎ௧௘௫ ൌ |ݎ௧| െ |ܨ௧ െ ܨ௧ିଵ|.   (22) 
ܸ௘௫ compares shifts of prices and fundamentals, where		ݎ௧௘௫ can be interpreted as the excess 
return. If prices tend to overreact (/underreact) to fundamental news, ܸ௘௫ is positive 
(/negative). 
Ratio of correct price reactions, C:  
 ܥ ൌ ே். (23) 
where N is the number of returns ݎ௧ with ݏ݃݊ሾݎ௧ሿ ൌൌ ݏ݃݊ሾܨ௧ െ ܨ௧ିଵሿ. ܥ captures the degree 
to which prices react to fundamental news.  
-- Figure 4 about here -- 
The results show that the effects on market efficiency are complex. On the one hand, market 
efficiency is improved as the tendency of prices to reproduce changes of fundamentals 
increases – a greater ߙ௑ leads to an increase of C rises and a decline of ܸ௘௫. The reason is 
that, the more exploiters remove patterns, the more the fundamental value tends to be the only 
determinant of prices, and this is noted again by exploiters. As a result, exploiters tend to turn 
to fundamentalists, who only react to fundamental news. (With reference to the prediction 
model defined by eq. (17), the regression coefficients ߚଶ and ߚଷ tend to 0). This also leads to a 
decline in market distortion. On the other hand, if ߙ௑ becomes very great, distortion tends to 
rise with relatively great variance between simulation runs. This result is due to the fact that 
pattern exploiters, in contrast to fundamentalists, do not trade on mispricing per se, but 
identify the fundamental value as the main determinant of prices. However, if ߙ௑ becomes 
relatively great, the dynamics of prices is driven mainly by exploiters who, thus, learn from 
themselves. This complicates an adequate estimation about the influence of fundamentals. As 
a result, discrepancies between the levels of prices and value can emerge. (With reference to 
the prediction model, ߚଵ deviates from 1).  
Note that the positive effects of pattern exploitation on market efficiency are dependent on the 
condition that exploiters recognize the true behavior of prices. It would be also possible that 
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exploiters identify pseudo-patterns. In this case, exploiters adopt noise-trader behavior as they 
“trade on noise as if it were information” (Black 1986). The identification of pseudo-patterns 
can occur, if exploiters do not know all the variables actually determining the evolution of 
prices (for example, exploiters could be interpreted as purely technical traders who do not 
know the fundamental value) or if they misinterpret dynamics of prices (for example, if 
exploiters consider relatively narrow time ranges, patterns might appear to be systematic 
which are in fact random). Experiments with such agents have shown that the trading on 
pseudo-patterns destabilizes market dynamics and leads to the emergence of typical stylized 
facts such as volatility clustering or heavy tails in the distribution of returns. However, as 
these phenomena lay beyond the focus of the present study, we leave a closer examination to 
future research. 
4. Conclusion  
In financial market models, the absence of systematic patterns in prices – an important 
stylized fact of real markets – is usually replicated by means of stochastic components. The 
present article has introduced a model in which systematic patterns are eliminated 
endogenously and in a reality-oriented fashion. This is achieved by the activity of intelligent 
traders who are able to identify the patterns in prices and exploit them. With perfect 
knowledge, regression techniques and artificial neuronal networks, three methods for the 
pattern identification and forecasting of model agents have been discussed. In the present 
model, a linear prediction model is used, which can be interpreted as the simplest form of an 
Artificial Neural Network (ANN). As ANNs are technical reproductions of the human brain, 
they might be regarded as quite an accurate way of modeling the cognition of financial 
traders. The simulation experiments confirmed that if the trading power of pattern exploiters 
is sufficiently great, systematic patterns disappear completely and prices evolve 
unpredictably. In sum, we believe the model to reproduce the mechanisms of pattern 
detection, exploitation and reduction quite realistically. An explanation for the putative 
unpredictability of prices and, in particular, the absence of autocorrelations in returns seems to 
be given.  
As incidental results, pattern exploiters, who trade on the true behavior of prices, were found 
to improve market efficiency as the tendency of prices to replicate fundamental news 
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increases. Yet price distortion may rise if the trading power of exploiters relative to 
fundamentalists becomes overwhelming. 
Needs and potential for future research are various. When developing the model, the focus 
was on the endogenous removal of systematic patterns. Other typical statistical properties of 
financial market dynamics (surveys by Guillaume et al., 1997; Cont 2001), such as volatility 
clustering or heavy tails in the return distribution, are left beyond consideration. Experiments 
have indicated that these stylized facts can emerge if pattern exploiters trade on pseudo-
patterns as their information level or intelligence is not sufficient to interpret the behavior of 
prices correctly. These insights and the methods described here could lead to a model which 
replicates the stylized facts of financial markets, including the unpredictability of prices, 
without exogenous noise being added.  
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Nr.  Article  Origin  Method for AA replication  Comment 
  2 Type Design 
1  Alfarano, Lux, and Wagner (2005)  IAH  Noise trader  AA not perfect 
2  Chiarella, He and Hommes (2006)  ABS  Random demand term in price adaption   
3  De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005)  ABS 
Exogenous noise: “Forecast errors of chartists and 
fundamentalists”  AA not shown 
4  Gaunersdorfer and Hommes (2007)  ABS  Random term in price adaption. "Noise Trader”   
5  Gilli and Winker (2003)  ANT  Random price shocks, noise in majority assessment   
6  He and Li (2007)  ABS  Random term in price adaption. "Noise Trader, unexpected market news"   
7  Hommes (2002)  ABS  Dividend noise, model approximation noise   
8  Kirman and Teyssiere (2002)  ANT  Random exchange rate, random interest rate   
9  Li and Rosser (2004)  ABS  None  AA not perfect 
10  Manzan and Westerhoff (2005)  ABS 
Demand entirely determined by randomly arriving 
news   
11  Winker and Gilli (2001)  ANT  Random demand term   
  3 Type Design 
12  Lux and Marchesi (2000)  IAH  Transition probabilities  AA not perfect 
13  Parke and Waters (2007)  ABS  Martingale news, martingale dividends   
  Many‐Type Design 
14  Challet and Galla (2005)  MG  Probabilistic trading decision  AA for some setups only 
15  Cross, et al. (2007)  MG  Random term in price adaption representing "exogenous information stream"   
16  Dicks and van der Weide (2005)  ABS  Random news affecting traders expectation 
Random Walk of 
Prices 
17  Ferreira, et al. (2005)  MG  Pattern exploitation?   
18  Ghoulmie, Cont and Nadal (2005)  TM  Random trading signal   
19  Iori (2002)  IM  Random trading signal (individual)   
20  Pollard (2006)  TM  Gaussian trading signal (“morning news”)   AA not shown 
21  Sallans, et al. (2003)  ABS  Random actions  AA not perfect 
22  Shimokawa, Suzuki and Misawa (2007)  PT 
Noise trader, Gaussian private signals for price 
prediction  AA not shown 
Autonomous Agent 
23  Arifovic and Gencay (2000)  SFI    No AA 
24  LeBaron, Arthur and Palmer (1999)  SFI  Stochastic dividend process  AA not shown 
25  Martinez‐Jaramillo and Tsang (2007)  SFI  Pure noise traders  AA not perfect 
26  Reimann and Tupak (2007)  SFI  random dividend process   
27  Tay and Lin (2001)  SFI  Stochastic dividend process, Random expectations of prices and dividends   
 
Table 1: Financial Market models listed in Chen (2009) method used to reproduce the absence of 
autocorrelations in returns (AA). Acronyms: ANT: Ant; ABS: Agent-based modeling; IAH: Interactive agent 
hypothesis; IM: Ising model; MG: Minority games; PT: Prospect-theory-based; SFI: Santa Fe artificial stock 
market; TM: Threshold model.  
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Parameter  Description  Value 
κ	α୊ reaction intensity of fundamentalists  1 
αେ reaction intensity of chartists  1 
αଡ଼ reaction intensity of pattern exploiters  10 
γ  rationality of strategy choice  350 
ߟ  weight of agents‘ memory  0.975 
ߪ  Standard deviation of changes of 
fundamental value 
0.01 
 
Table 1: The model parameters and their setting. 
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Fig. 1: Price and value (top), and autocorrelation of returns (bottom) without pattern exploiters. Autocorrelations 
based on 10,000 simulation periods. Top: Price and fundamental Value. Bottom: Autocorrelations of returns. 
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Fig, 2: Typical simulation run with pattern exploiters. Top: Price and fundamental Value. Center: Share of 
strategies. Bottom: Autocorrelations of returns. 
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Fig. 3: Summary statistics − measures of predictability. 1% level of significance indicated by gray horizontal 
lines. Top: Autocorrelation with ݈ܽ݃ ൌ 1 and ݈ܽ݃ ൌ 2; Bottom: Conditional mean return, conditional price 
return auto-correlation with ݈ܽ݃ ൌ 1 and ݈ܽ݃ ൌ 2. 
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Fig. 4: Summary statistics – market efficiency.  
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